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State-based health insurance exchanges are 
a critical component of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) provisions to 
expand access to coverage to millions of  
Americans. In addition to being the gateway  
for people to purchase subsidized health  
insurance, exchanges are expected to help 
organize insurance markets and promote more 
effective competition among health plans. There 
is, however, disagreement among policy-makers 
over whether and how exchanges should be 
able to act on behalf of individual and small 
group buyers to demand higher-quality  
products at more affordable prices. Some 
policy-makers believe that the exchanges  
must be “active purchasers,” empowered to 
selectively contract with carriers, set tougher 
participation criteria than the federal standards 
and/or negotiate price discounts in order to 
effectively serve consumers. Others believe 
the best way to serve consumers is to have the 
exchange provide the broadest possible array  
of plans (a “Travelocity” approach).
In our research we found that active purchasing is not 
just one activity and it doesn’t just involve determining 
whether plans should be in or out of an exchange. Rather, 
it can encompass a wide range of activities to leverage 
higher-quality, more affordable insurance for individuals 
and small businesses.
We also assess environmental factors in the states that 
would support – or undermine – the range of active 
purchasing activities in which an exchange may wish to 
engage. We conclude that even in states with the least 
hospitable environments for active purchasing efforts, 
there will be some important activities that the exchange 
leadership can undertake on behalf of enrollees. Selected 
findings include the following:
  • The ACA requires states to authorize their exchanges to 
take on a number of activities that go beyond the role of 
a passive clearinghouse. At a minimum, each exchange 
must have the authority to exercise its own judgment of 
whether a health plan’s participation is “in the interests 
of” consumers and employers in the exchange.
  • The ACA permits exchanges to take on a wide range 
of activities to promote the availability of high-quality, 
affordable insurance products. These include, but are 
not limited to:
  › Setting additional certification criteria that reflect 
the state’s goals for such things as population health, 
plan quality, access to providers, delivery system 
reform and transparency;
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  › Using a selective contracting process to negotiate 
better prices and higher-quality from plans;
  › Managing product choices and setting parameters 
for cost-sharing;
  › Leveraging quality improvement and delivery 
system reforms by encouraging participating health 
plans to implement strategies to promote the 
delivery of better coordinated, more efficient health 
care services;
  › Aligning with other large purchasers in the state, 
such as large employer coalitions, the Medicaid 
agency and/or the state government employee 
benefits agency to send consistent purchasing signals 
to health insurance carriers and providers;
  › Recruiting new insurance carriers, particularly in 
states with highly concentrated insurance markets. 
Such an approach could also include providing 
technical assistance to regional, home-grown or 
Medicaid carriers to help them become exchange 
participants; and
  › Leveraging consumer decision-making through 
better information and web-based decision tools.
  • There are environmental factors that could support 
– or undermine – active purchasing in the states. 
Each state will face a different calculus in whether 
and how to pursue active purchasing for its exchange, 
depending on such factors as market concentration, 
market rules, the number and health status of 
exchange enrollees and the exchange’s ability to recruit 
and maintain a leadership and staff free from conflicts 
of interest and with the requisite expertise.
  • Exchanges that sit in highly concentrated insurance 
markets are limited in how selective they can be, but 
they can pursue other strategies to improve value for 
enrollees. Exchanges need an appealing mix of health 
plan offerings to attract and sustain enrollment, 
particularly for small employers and unsubsidized 
individuals. While an exchange in a concentrated 
market may have limited leverage to negotiate price 
discounts, they could work to recruit new market 
entrants or encourage smaller carriers that may be able 
to expand market share through an exchange. They 
can also focus on promoting better consumer decision-
making and encouraging competition based on value. 
The exchange could also collaborate with other large 
purchasers to align purchasing strategies.
  • The size of the exchange impacts its ability to exercise 
leverage. Even though the exchange will be the 
exclusive source of coverage for most individuals 
eligible for federal premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies, in many states it will represent a relatively 
small share of the total commercial market. And small 
businesses and individuals will have alternative options 
in the outside market. In addition, states that establish 
Basic Health Plans may draw from the exchange a 
significant proportion of its subsidy-eligible enrollees. 
As a result, it is important not to overestimate the 
exchange’s leverage to negotiate with carriers.
  • The rules for the market outside the exchange are 
critical to successful active purchasing. If the exchange 
cannot capture a large enough share of the healthy 
participants in the commercial market, the whole 
notion of being an active purchaser is largely moot 
– it will not be able to attract a sufficient number of 
carriers with which to negotiate. The exchange will 
also need to worry about adverse selection among 
plans within the exchange. Officials involved in 
existing exchanges report that “carriers’ confidence in 
risk adjustment is critical.”
  • Being an effective active purchaser requires resources, 
data-driven knowledge of the markets and the 
expertise to negotiate with carriers. Active purchasing 
cannot be done effectively without an infrastructure 
to do it. However, some states may face challenges 
assembling a board of directors with sufficient 
expertise that is also free from conflicts of interests. 
Others may find it similarly difficult to recruit and 
retain a staff that can perform the necessary duties. 
And maintaining the necessary personnel will 
require raising revenue, which in many cases will be 
accompanied by political pressure to demonstrate that 
the public investment is worth it.
Active Purchasing for Health Insurance Exchanges: An Analysis of Options 2
  • Negotiating price discounts from carriers will likely 
prove challenging for many exchanges. The fact that 
the exchange is not the sole distribution channel for 
insurance products could limit its leverage to negotiate 
prices with carriers. This is in part because the ACA 
requires that prices for the same products be the same 
inside and outside the exchange, meaning that any 
price discount negotiated by the exchange would have 
to be implemented in the outside market as well. For 
most carriers, the exchange won’t be a big enough 
book of business to justify such across-the-board rate 
reductions. Most importantly, however, negotiating 
price discounts year-to-year with carriers does nothing 
to tackle the long-term problem for consumers and 
small businesses: the runaway growth in the costs of 
health care.
  • Exchanges may have the greatest potential to 
improve value by incentivizing health plans and, in 
turn, providers to deliver higher-quality care, more 
efficiently. By consolidating individuals and small 
groups and potentially partnering with other large 
purchasers to align purchasing strategies, the exchange 
can encourage long-term delivery system reforms that 
can help improve the quality of care and mitigate the 
unsustainable trend in health care inflation.
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State-based health insurance exchanges are a critical 
component of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s (ACA) provisions to expand access to coverage to 
millions of Americans. In addition to being the gateway 
for people to purchase subsidized health insurance, 
exchanges are expected to help organize insurance markets 
and promote more effective competition among health 
plans. There is, however, disagreement among policy-
makers over whether and how exchanges should take on a 
more active role in promoting a reformed marketplace.
To be sustainable, exchanges will have to take on a 
minimum set of activities, not the least of which will 
be monitoring risk among plans within the exchange 
and closely tracking prices and products in the outside 
market. They will need to make sure the consumer 
shopping experience is as simple and streamlined as 
possible, including helping people enroll – and re-enroll 
– in the program most appropriate for them, whether it 
is Medicaid, CHIP, another state program or premium 
subsidies through the exchange. They’ll need to run an 
effective Navigator program and work with insurance 
brokers and community groups to reach potential 
customers, educate them about their new rights and 
responsibilities under the law, sign them up for coverage 
and effectively respond to complaints. All of these 
activities suggest an exchange that is active in shaping the 
marketplace, rather than a passive conduit of information 
between buyers and sellers. However, these activities are 
just a necessary prerequisite for an exchange to be an 
active purchaser. As an active purchaser, an exchange 
not only needs to be a market organizer, it must be able 
and willing to act on behalf of individual and small 
group buyers to demand higher-quality products at more 
affordable prices. 
Whether and how state exchanges should be active 
purchasers have been focal points of debate as states 
consider legislation to establish exchanges under the ACA. 
Many believe that the exchange must be empowered to 
selectively contract with carriers, set tougher participation 
criteria than the federal standards and/or negotiate price 
discounts in order to effectively serve consumers. Other 
stakeholders believe the best way to serve consumers is to 
have the exchange provide the broadest possible array of 
plans (the “Travelocity” approach).
Through a review of primary and secondary source 
materials and interviews with officials currently or 
formerly responsible for running purchasing exchanges 
or groups that service individuals, employees and small 
businesses, we assess existing efforts to provide value-
oriented products to subscribers. We conclude that 
active purchasing is not just one activity. Rather, it can 
encompass a wide range of activities to leverage higher-
quality, more affordable health insurance for individuals 
and small businesses.
From our review of existing exchanges and augmented by 
interviews with national health policy experts, we discuss 
environmental factors in the states that would support – 
or undermine – the range of active purchasing activities 
in which an exchange may wish to engage. All of the 
active purchasing activities we identify will not work in all 
states. By the same token, even in states that have the least 
conducive environments for active purchasing efforts, 
there will be some important activities the exchange 
leadership can undertake to deliver better quality, 
affordable products to their enrollees. The findings in the 
paper are the authors’ alone and should not be attributed 
to any individuals or groups with whom we consulted.
Introduction 
What it Means to be an Active Purchaser
The notion of a market sponsor that is also an active 
purchaser has a long history, with roots in the concept  
of managed competition. As articulated in 1993 by Alain 
Enthoven, managed competition involves “intelligent, 
active collective purchasing agents” acting on behalf of 
enrollees and “connotes the ability to use judgment to 
achieve goals…to be able to negotiate.” And it uses “rules 
for competition…to reward…those health plans that 
do the best job of improving quality, cutting cost and 
satisfying patients.”1 
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Health insurance exchanges build on Enthoven’s vision. 
They could be empowered to act on behalf of consumers 
and small business owners in a number of ways that 
would drive value. In its initial guidance to states about 
insurance exchanges, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) has interpreted the law to allow 
a state to empower its exchange to be an active purchaser, 
“using market leverage and the tools of managed 
competition to negotiate product offerings with insurers,” 
much like a large employer would. And while HHS notes 
that a state can operate its exchange as a “clearinghouse 
that is open to all qualified insurers,” the law sets 
boundaries on how open that clearinghouse can be.2  
Minimum Requirements Under the ACA
Whether or not a state chooses to empower its exchange 
to be an active purchaser, the ACA requires exchanges to 
take on a number of activities that go well beyond the  
role of a passive clearinghouse. For example, exchanges 
cannot take “any willing plan.” To participate, plans  
must not only provide the federally prescribed essential 
benefits package3 and offer products that meet minimum 
cost-sharing and actuarial value standards, they must 
satisfy a set of certification criteria. These criteria include, 
for example:
  • Marketing standards. Plans cannot use marketing 
or benefit design to discourage sicker people from 
enrolling.
  • Network adequacy. Plans must provide a sufficient 
choice of providers and notify consumers about 
the availability of in-network and out-of-network 
providers. Plans must also include within their 
networks essential community providers that serve 
low-income, medically underserved individuals.
  •  Accreditation. Plans must be accredited based on 
clinical quality measures and patient experience 
ratings, including their performance on consumer 
access, utilization management, quality assurance, 
provider credentialing, complaints and appeals and 
other factors.
  • Quality improvement. Plans must implement 
a quality improvement strategy that includes 
implementing quality reporting, case management, 
care coordination, prevention of hospital readmissions, 
activities to improve patient safety and activities to 
reduce health disparities.
  • Standardization. Plans must use a uniform 
enrollment form and standardized format for 
summarizing the benefits in their products.
  • Transparency. Plans must provide to enrollees 
and prospective enrollees information on their 
performance on quality metrics. They must also  
report to HHS their performance on pediatric  
quality measures.4
In addition to these criteria, the exchange must 
determine that each plan’s participation is “in the 
interests of” consumers and employers in the exchange.5 
This federal standard is subjective and the leadership 
of state exchanges could implement it in a myriad of 
ways. But at a minimum, it means that if the exchange 
leadership decides a plan’s participation is not in the 
interests of consumers and business owners, it can reject 
it. And presumably, no state legislature could take away 
the exchange’s ability to make that kind of subjective 
judgment without falling out of compliance with the 
ACA. Indeed, HHS’s January 2011 Funding Opportunity 
Announcement (FOA) for exchange planning and 
implementation makes clear that, to be certified as 
compliant (and avoid a federally established exchange), 
exchanges must have “the capacity and authority to 
take all actions necessary to meet Federal standards, 
including the discretion to determine whether health plans 
offered through the Exchange are in the interests of qualified 
individuals and qualified employers” 6 (emphasis added).
Similarly, while the ACA does not mandate that 
exchanges engage in price negotiations with carriers, 
it encourages exchanges to monitor rates inside and 
outside the exchange. At a minimum, all exchanges 
must review plans’ requested premium increases before 
they go into effect and take the information they 
receive in that process into consideration when deciding 
whether to accept or reject a plan in the exchange.7 The 
law also requires exchanges to take into account any 
recommendations from the state department of insurance 
(DOI) on whether to exclude a health plan because of 
a “pattern or practice of excessive or unjustified rate 
increases.”8 The ACA also sets some limits on exchanges’ 
ability to regulate the market. It prohibits exchanges 
from excluding a health plan through “the imposition of 
premium price controls.”9 The law does not define what a 
“premium price control” is, but presumably it means that 
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the exchange cannot dictate the price a plan can charge 
for a particular package of benefits.
Once plans are selected to participate, the ACA supports 
the exchange continuing to take an active role in 
managing the products it offers. For example, exchanges 
must assign each product with a rating based on relative 
quality and price.10 HHS is tasked with developing the 
rating methodology and the exchange must post each 
rating on its web portal, along with information on the 
level of enrollee satisfaction in each health plan.11 The 
exchange must also display on its web portal health 
plans’ product offerings within prescribed benefit 
levels, based on actuarial value (i.e. Bronze, Silver, Gold 
and Platinum).12 For most states, this implies that the 
exchange will have to exert some effort to make sure 
issuers are actually in compliance with the actuarial value 
standard. For example, the exchange may want to ensure 
that a plan claiming a Silver level designation actually has 
the requisite combination of benefits and cost-sharing to 
achieve the required 70% actuarial value.13
In addition, because the ACA empowers exchanges to  
re-certify and de-certify qualified health plans, the 
exchange will need to monitor the plans’ marketing 
standards, network adequacy requirements and other 
certification criteria on an ongoing basis to ensure that 
they are living up to their obligations.14 The law assists 
exchanges in this role by requiring qualified health plans 
to submit to the exchange, HHS and the state’s DOI 
an array of business practice data, including data on 
rating practices, claims payment policies and practices, 
enrollment and disenrollment, denied claims and cost-
sharing for out-of-network care. Plans must also submit 
“periodic financial disclosures” to the exchange.15 HHS 
will presumably issue regulations with guidance to states 
on the depth and scope of data that plans will need to 
make available, but exchanges will be able to make use of 
such disclosures to assess plans’ fitness to remain in the 
exchange on an ongoing basis.
Active Purchasing: A Wide Range of Activities
The federal law sets a floor, but state exchanges that 
wish to take on the role of active purchaser can take on 
a much wider array of activities to try to promote access 
to more affordable, higher-quality insurance products for 
consumers and small businesses. The broad wording of 
the ACA’s provision requiring exchanges to consider “the 
interests of” participating individuals and employers gives 
them considerable discretion to decide what activities to 
pursue, within the context of local market conditions, 
stakeholder interests and its resources and capacity.
Additional Certification Criteria
While the ACA lays out minimum federal standards for 
participation in the exchanges, states have considerable 
flexibility to add to those standards with criteria that 
reflect the state’s goals for such things as population 
health, plan quality, access to providers, delivery system 
reform and transparency. For example, the exchange 
could require participating plans to engage in specific 
efforts to promote interoperable health IT in clinical 
settings, implement strategies to ensure continuity of care 
for individuals whose income changes cause them to gain 
or lose eligibility for public programs or coordinate with 
state public health officials on emerging public health 
challenges.16 However, because additional certification 
criteria could add to plans’ costs and are not required of 
plans in the outside market, the exchange will need to be 
mindful of any effect on premiums in the exchange.
Exchanges could also require participating plans to 
provide benefits in addition to those required by federal 
Examples of Active Purchasing
  • Additional certification criteria
  • Selective contracting
  • Negotiation on price/quality
  • Limiting the number of products
  • Setting standards for cost-sharing
  • Piloting new delivery system and reimbursement 
strategies
  • Aligning with other state purchasers (i.e., Medicaid, 
state employee plans)
  • Recruiting and assisting new market entrants
  • Use of web-based decision tools to drive value-
oriented decisions by consumers
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law in the essential benefits package. Such additional 
benefits could reflect existing state benefit mandates that 
were not included in the federal package; or they could  
be added over time in response to emerging consumer 
needs, scientific advancement and changes in the evidence 
base. However, such benefits could add to the premium, 
and the ACA requires states to defray any premium costs 
above those associated with the federally defined essential 
benefit package.17
Selective Contracting and Price Negotiation
Many stakeholders and advocates view the ability of the 
exchange to selectively contract with health insurance 
carriers to be the lynchpin of active purchasing. In a 
competitive health insurance marketplace, with multiple 
plans seeking access to exchange enrollees, the authority 
to limit the number of plans could give an exchange 
leverage to negotiate better prices and quality. 
To the extent an exchange is able to selectively contract 
with health plans, the process would involve two steps: 
first, an initial certification that a plan is eligible to 
participate in the exchange because it meets the necessary 
ACA criteria, as well as any additional criteria the 
exchange may impose. Second, certified plans would  
be allowed to bid for exchange business and plans would 
be chosen based on their bids. That bidding could take 
place through a formal “Request for Proposals” (RFP) 
process in which the lowest bidders would win. It might 
also involve less formal negotiations between the  
exchange and carriers.
Case Studies of Active Purchasing –  
On the Ground Efforts to Promote Value  
in Insurance Coverage
With the exception of large employer-purchasers 
like California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), and the Massachusetts Connector Authority,  
we were unable to find many examples of existing 
insurance exchanges that take on the activities that 
connote active purchasing. And those that do engage 
in these activities have unique characteristics and 
environments that make their efforts more feasible. 
CalPERS, for example, has a largely “captive” population 
of state government employers. The Massachusetts 
Connector was created in a relatively competitive 
insurance market, with a foundation of market rules 
that ensured a level playing field. It also created a 
separate marketplace for subsidized individuals and, at 
least initially, limited access to that market to Medicaid 
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). In this paper we 
include short case studies of existing “exchanges,” each 
of which falls along a continuum of what it means to be  
an active purchaser.
Massachusetts’ Connector Authority
The Connector began enrolling individuals in 2006, 
just months after enactment of the law that created 
the exchange. The Connector is administered by a 
quasi-public agency and operates two exchanges: 
Commonwealth Care (CommCare) as the marketplace 
for individuals eligible for subsidies and Commonwealth 
Choice (CommChoice) as the marketplace for 
unsubsidized individuals and small businesses. The 
Connector covers 220,000 individuals, of which 40,000 
are individuals in CommChoice and 4,500 are enrolled 
through small business.22 
The Massachusetts Connector has been able to use 
selective contracting in CommCare, largely because it 
serves a captive population: subsidies for those under 
300 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) are only 
available through CommCare. It has structured the bidding 
and enrollment process to encourage the lowest-possible 
bids, resulting in an annual rate of increase in premiums 
of under 5 percent – about half the rate of growth in 
commercial health insurance.23 With CommCare, noted 
a former official, “We have the same tools any large 
employer has.”24 In addition, when CommCare opened to 
new plans, the Connector worked hard to recruit a national 
carrier, Centene, to offer coverage with tighter provider 
networks in both CommCare and CommChoice. Because 
Centene’s product offerings (called Celticare) had a lower 
cost structure, the Connector leveraged those to garner 
lower bids from the original participating plans.25
While CommChoice’s population is not “captive,” in that 
unsubsidized individuals and small businesses have 
similar products available to them in the outside market, 
the Connector has undertaken active purchasing functions 
in CommChoice. However, its efforts to push plans on 
its quality and efficiency goals must be balanced with 
the need to offer an attractive and affordable mix of plan 
offerings. Carriers must gain the Connector “Seal of 
Approval” to participate and the Connector staff has used 
market research to require plans to limit the number of 
products offered and standardize cost sharing. However, 
like the other exchanges examined in this report, the 
Connector does not negotiate on price, since it has limited 
leverage to do so. As one board member put it: “With 
CommChoice we’re largely just a price taker.”26 However, 
the Connector has effectively used the standardization 
of benefits and “guarantee” of quality products to drive 
consumer shopping that is based primarily on value.27
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Large employers that engage in active purchasing, such 
as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), use the contracting process extensively to 
extract the best possible value from participating plans. 
For example, CalPERS incorporates into their contracts 
metrics to assess their plans’ financial performance and 
customer service and actively encourages their plans 
to implement delivery system and care management 
reforms that will improve outcomes and reduce health 
care costs.18 CalPERS also reserves the right to audit 
plans’ calculations of rates. As Priya Mathur, Chair of the 
CalPERS Health Committee noted, “We do that because 
we want the best rate possible and because we don’t feel 
we can just accept what their black box process says their 
rate should be.”19
Non-employer based exchanges that offer possible 
models of selective contracting include the Massachusetts 
Connector and the law creating the California exchange, 
which requires the exchange board to selectively contract 
with carriers “so as to provide health care coverage choices 
that offer the optimal combination of choice, value, 
quality and service.”20 
Since its first year of operation in 2007, the Massachusetts 
Connector has used its authority to select participating 
plans to obtain premium discounts from carriers. In its 
subsidized market, Commonwealth Care, officials report 
that the average annual rate of increase in premiums per 
covered person has been held under 5% – about half the 
rate of growth in commercial health insurance. Although 
it also selectively contracts in its unsubsidized market, the 
Connector has had less leverage with carriers because it is 
not the sole distribution channel for insurance products. 
Coupled with the fact that rates for the same products 
have to be the same in the Connector and the outside 
markets, the Connector is simply not big enough to 
demand big price discounts in the unsubsidized market.21
Managing Product Choices and Setting  
Parameters for Cost Sharing
An active purchaser exchange might not only manage 
the number and quality of participating carriers, but also 
manage the number and type of products they offer. For 
states with concentrated insurance markets, it may be 
more desirable to allow all qualified carriers to participate 
but limit their product offerings. As noted above, the 
ACA requires plans to offer products with at least the 
essential benefits package at specified actuarial value 
levels (Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum); it does not 
require any further standardization of cost-sharing. Thus, 
participating carriers could offer potentially hundreds 
of products at each actuarial value, with different 
permutations of cost-sharing and additional benefits. 
Many experts believe there are considerable advantages 
to greater benefit standardization. Research has shown 
that too much choice among health insurance products 
can be confusing to consumers and lead them to 
purchase products that do not best meet their needs.28 
In Massachusetts, focus groups of consumers enrolled in 
coverage through the Connector indicated that the degree 
of product choice initially offered was overwhelming.29 In 
the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, which provides 
private coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has noted that 
in many areas the plethora of plan options has resulted in 
beneficiary confusion and difficulty in choosing a plan 
that meets their needs.30 In 2012, CMS will approve only 
Medicare D plans that are “substantially different from 
those currently on the market by the same insurer.”31
Limiting the number of available benefit designs can 
also narrow carriers’ ability to use benefit design to select 
favorable risk. Research has shown that plans can use 
flexibility to adjust cost-sharing for certain services to 
attract the healthiest enrollees and deter sicker ones.  
For example, in Medicare Advantage, some plans  
imposed higher co-payment charges for days in the 
hospital and costly treatments like chemotherapy than  
in traditional Medicare.32 CMS became concerned 
about the resulting adverse selection and has moved to 
standardize cost-sharing.33
For both reasons – to help consumers make better choices 
more easily and to limit carriers’ opportunities for risk 
selection – the  Massachusetts Connector has limited 
carriers to offering only a certain number of products at 
each benefit level (three at the Bronze level, two at the 
Silver level and one at the Gold level). It has also moved 
to standardize deductibles and co-payments for certain 
clinical services.34 HealthPass New York’s exchange 
actively structures benefits,35 as does Washington’s 
new Health Insurance Partnership (HIP), a federally 
subsidized small business exchange.36
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However, exchanges should approach benefit 
standardization with some caution. Setting cost-sharing 
parameters up front could meet resistance from carriers 
who may have to create whole new products, rather than 
offer existing ones. The exchange will also want to ensure 
that a more limited array of products is in line with – and 
keeps up with – consumer preferences. For example, 
the Massachusetts Connector did not require greater 
standardization until it had clear evidence of consumer 
demand for a narrower set of products as well as data on 
the products to which consumers were gravitating.37  
In addition, to the extent an exchange promotes 
standardized benefit designs, it will need to be sensitive 
to the impact on potential innovations that could benefit 
consumers and promote value, such as “value based”  
cost-sharing (“VBID”) or provider tiering based on 
quality and efficiency.38
Leveraging Quality Improvement and Delivery 
System Reforms
Many policy experts and administrators of employer 
and government purchasing programs believe that the 
long-term benefits of health insurance exchanges lie not 
in their ability to negotiate rates with health plans in the 
short-term, but rather to help align incentives among 
purchasers and payers to encourage long-term, systemic 
changes in the way health care is paid for and delivered.43 
As Priya Mathur of CalPERS noted, “Just negotiating on 
price with an insurance company is not sufficient. Active 
purchasing is an opportunity to get at what’s underlying 
Washington Health Insurance Partnership
The Washington state Health Insurance Partnership (HIP) 
opened to enrollment in January, providing subsidized 
coverage options to small, low-wage firms. The program 
targets small firms (up to 50 employees) where half the 
employees earn less than 200 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) and the firm does not offer coverage. 
These firms either cannot afford to contribute the share 
of premium required in the small group market (between 
75 and 100 percent) or their low-wage employees cannot 
afford their share of the premium.39 HIP allows employers 
to contribute as little as 40 percent of the premium and 
subsidizes between 60 and 90 percent of the worker’s 
share based on household income. Currently, small firms 
use a broker to select and enroll in a plan, but the law 
requires HIP to allow employees to choose their coverage 
beginning in 2013.
The program is administered by the state agency that also 
administers the state employee and Basic Health Plan (BHP) 
offerings. By law, the HIP Board selects products offered 
in the small group market that fit within four categories: 
comprehensive, mid-range, a Health Savings Account (HSA) 
eligible high-deductible plan and a catastrophic plan. The 
board has engaged in some standardization of benefits 
by defining the deductibles that correspond to those four 
levels of coverage. After some debate, the board decided 
to include a catastrophic plan option (with deductibles of 
$5,000) to give employers that previously did not offer health 
insurance a low-cost option; however, no enrollees have 
chosen this plan to date. Plan administrators speculate 
this is because employers are able to choose more 
comprehensive coverage for their workers because of the 
employee subsidy and the reduced contribution requirement 
for employers. HIP intends to monitor enrollment in each of 
its plan levels to better understand the products to which 
employers are gravitating.40
HIP views itself as an “organizer” because they are required 
by statute to choose products already available in the small 
group market. However, they do carry out one of the key 
activities of active purchasing: the board has a selection 
process for participating carriers that asks the carriers to 
submit appropriate products for the target population with 
benefit values calculated against a benchmark plan (the 
state’s self-funded health plan). The plans were then ordered 
according to the four categories, from comprehensive to 
catastrophic, based on the actuarial value of each plan. 
The goal was to establish groups or “tiers” of plans in each 
category and to minimize the amount of variation in the 
actuarial value within each category.41
HIP officials believe the program will be successful 
because of a number of factors. First, they largely serve 
a captive audience, since the employee subsidies and 
reduced employer contribution rate are limited to products 
sold by HIP. Second, HIP credits the first year’s limited 
enrollment and the uniformity of market rules governing 
plans operating inside and outside as key to the program’s 
partnership with carriers willing to participate.42 HIP may 
take on a more active role as enrollment grows, including 
instituting a requirement that carriers offer products in all 
four tiers. And the HIP board has created a risk adjustment 
subcommittee to consider implementing risk adjustment 
when “employee choice” is implemented in 2013. 
Currently, 52 individuals are enrolled through 14 small 
businesses. Enrollment is limited by available federal 
funding, which was originally expected to last for three 
years and allow for up to 4,000 subsidized lives. However, 
the FY2010 federal budget put in jeopardy future 
funding for the program after August 31, 2011. Program 
administrators are awaiting further word on the status of 
future funding. 
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the trend. You have to get down to the provider and the 
member level.”44
While some large employers have acted to drive delivery 
system and payment reforms at the provider level through 
their contracts with health plans, individual and small 
group purchasers have been absent from those efforts 
because they haven’t had the infrastructure, capacity 
or market leverage to participate. At the same time, 
many insurance markets are experiencing a wave of 
consolidation among hospital and physician groups, 
giving those groups greater leverage to raise prices.45 
As a result, some health plans may actually welcome 
an exchange that is active in this area. An official with 
one health plan put it this way: “For those of us who 
are negotiating with providers, we might like to see an 
exchange putting requirements on plans that give us 
leverage in those negotiations.”46 
For example, CalPERS is moving to implement initiatives 
with its participating health plans that will drive 
delivery system reform at the provider level. It recently 
announced the results of a pilot to develop Affordable 
Care Organizations (ACOs) in partnership with one of 
its participating health plans, Blue Shield of California. 
Launched in January 2010, CalPERS reports the program 
is showing positive health outcomes (i.e., reduced hospital 
readmissions) and has generated an estimated $15.5 
million in cost savings.47
The grocery chain Safeway, a self-insured purchaser, 
is also working to lower its costs and improve health 
outcomes. For example, while the company imposes no 
cost-sharing for colonoscopies in order to encourage at-
risk employees to undergo the screening, they discovered 
that providers were charging widely disparate rates for 
the same exact procedure, with no discernable difference 
in quality. In the San Francisco Bay Area alone, the cost 
of a colonoscopy ranged from $880 to $8,650. Safeway 
now uses “reference pricing” for colonoscopy and other 
services, letting employees know that it would pay up to 
$1,500 for the procedure; employees who go to higher-
priced providers must pay the difference.48 The goal of the 
program is to change consumer behavior by encouraging 
employees to obtain preventive services from lower-cost 
providers. It may also have the effect of encouraging 
providers to charge prices for their services that are more 
in line with their costs.
States may consider whether their exchange could act as 
catalysts for quality improvement and delivery system 
change in the market just as purchasers like CalPERS and 
Safeway do. The ACA plants seeds for this by requiring 
exchange plans to report to HHS and their enrollees 
about their programs to improve health outcomes, reduce 
hospital readmissions, implement patient safety and error 
reduction programs, promote prevention and wellness 
and reduce health disparities.49 Further, to participate 
in the exchange, plans must be accredited by an entity 
such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA), which accredits health plans based on quality 
performance and patient experience. Other requirements 
for participating plans include: implementing provider 
payment strategies to improve quality and patient safety, 
requiring participating hospitals to implement patient 
safety systems and use discharge planning for patients and 
including in their networks only those doctors and other 
providers who implement certain quality improvement 
mechanisms.50
An exchange could aggregate the purchasing power 
of individuals and small groups to encourage more 
coordinated and efficient care. Building on the example 
of purchasers such as CalPERS and Safeway, exchanges 
might encourage plans to implement new reimbursement 
strategies and value-oriented benefit designs to improve 
health outcomes and perhaps also reduce the long-term 
trend in health care costs. Such initiatives might best 
evolve as part of a long-term strategy, in cooperation  
with other purchasers and with input from providers  
and consumers.
Alignment with Other State Purchasers
Policy experts have expressed the concern that, as 
envisioned under the ACA, exchanges may not have a 
sufficient proportion of the commercial insurance market 
to leverage change in the behavior of plans or providers.54 
An exchange might gain sufficient leverage in a number 
of ways, such as aligning purchasing strategies with large 
employer coalitions, state government employee benefit 
agencies and/or state Medicaid and CHIP programs. Such 
an effort does not mean combining risk pools, but rather 
it would require the exchange leadership to coordinate 
purchasing initiatives with these entities so that all are 
sending consistent signals to carriers and providers. 
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For example, many purchasers are interested in promoting 
“medical homes,” primary care physician practices that 
agree to take on accountability for the full range of 
patients’ health needs, usually for a fixed per-member 
per-month payment. There is evidence that medical 
homes have the potential to improve patient care while 
reducing spending.55 However, many physician practice 
groups are reluctant to undertake the necessary IT and 
workforce investments required to achieve a medical 
home designation if only a small percentage of their 
patient population would be enrolled. To the extent large 
purchasers in the state all require carriers to implement 
medical homes, this could greatly expand the number of 
patients involved, encouraging primary care physician 
groups to form medical homes and specialists to 
cooperate with medical home protocols. Similarly, many 
providers complain about the plethora of carriers’ “pay for 
performance” (P4P) programs, each with a different set of 
quality measures and different payment structure. If all 
carriers were essentially implementing the P4P programs 
with aligned measures and types of incentives, providers 
might be more likely to participate.
Recruiting New Market Entrants
Exchanges that sit in concentrated insurance markets, 
where one or two carriers dominate the individual and 
small group markets, may find an active purchasing role 
more challenging. While the ACA attempts to encourage 
new competition through the creation of multi-state 
insurance plans56 and health insurance cooperatives,57 
these programs have yet to be developed and it is too 
soon to assess whether they will be successful. In a highly 
concentrated market, an exchange might work to recruit 
new carriers to the state or assist home-grown regional 
carriers or Medicaid plans to meet requirements for 
offering products through the exchange. Such efforts 
could involve technical assistance or using a request 
for proposals (RFP) process to entice new entrants. In 
states with high-quality regional carriers with integrated 
or local networks, exchanges need to be careful about 
requirements that might inadvertently prevent them 
from participating. For example, a requirement that 
participating carriers offer coverage state-wide could limit 
competition without offsetting advantages.58
The Massachusetts Connector worked in 2009 (for 
FY2010) to recruit Centene, a national for-profit 
carrier, to enter the state and offer products in both 
the subsidized and unsubsidized markets. It was the 
first major new market entrant in the state in decades.59 
In subsequent rounds of contracting, Centene’s low 
premiums encouraged other carriers to compete on price. 
The Connector also worked with a Medicaid managed 
care organization (MCO) to obtain a commercial license, 
enabling it to become the eighth plan offering the 
Commonwealth Choice product.60
California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS)
CalPERS is the second largest public purchaser of 
coverage in the nation after the federal government. 
Administered by the state of California, it purchases 
health benefits for more than 1,100 local and 
government agencies and school employers. It offers 
three health maintenance organization (HMO) products 
offered through two carriers and three self-funded 
preferred provider organization (PPO) products.51
CalPERS views itself as an employer purchaser, 
aligning with other employer purchasing groups and 
functions like an active purchaser exchange. CalPERS 
uses purchasing on behalf of 1.3 million beneficiaries 
to drive better value from the plans with which it 
contracts. The board decided in 2002 to modify the 
contracting process to strengthen its purchasing clout. 
In that year, the board moved from an “any willing 
plan” process to multi-year, performance-based 
contracts with carriers.52 The number of carriers was 
narrowed in order to concentrate CalPERS purchasing 
power “at a time when providers in California were 
consolidating their power.”53 The remaining carriers 
each got a bigger share of the total enrollment and 
had greater incentive to partner with CalPERS on 
value based purchasing. The contracting process now 
incorporates performance metrics – both financial 
and customer service – as well as auditing in their 
contracts with insurers. Their purchasing approach 
is to “actively manage the trend” in health care costs, 
with contract terms that vary by plan depending on the 
goals they’re pursuing with the plan. For example, they 
have partnered with participating plans to do disease 
management and pilot an ACO.  
Participating employers are set in statute and have 
the option to purchase coverage outside of CalPERS. 
However, the population enrolled in CalPERS is 
relatively stable and largely captive. In response to 
some groups leaving to take “teaser rates” from plans 
operating in the outside market, CalPERS instituted a 
five-year-lock out period on any employer that leaves 
CalPERS, which has substantially reduced the number 
of employers leaving CalPERS. 
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Leveraging Consumer Decision-Making
Active purchasing also involves changing consumer 
behavior. Exchanges will have new transparency rules and 
web portals to help consumers make more informed and 
value-based comparisons of health plan products.
The notion of “plan chooser software” is not new; it has 
been used for years by large employers and on-line brokers 
such as ehealthinsurance.com and has been implemented 
in both the Utah and Massachusetts exchanges. What is 
more innovative is the idea that such software can be used 
strategically to empower consumers to make more value-
oriented decisions. As one expert noted, most consumers 
shop for plans based on only two dimensions: price and 
provider.61 These two dimensions tell consumers very 
little about plan benefits, customer service or provider 
quality, limiting their ability to choose plans that align 
with all of their needs.
Many exchange planners are thinking about ways to use 
the web to guide consumers in new ways, “designing for 
the future, not where consumers are now.”62 The ACA 
encourages exchanges to use their websites to provide 
an unprecedented amount of information to consumers 
about health insurance products, such as a standardized 
summary of benefit form, proposed or approved premium 
increases, actuarial value, the medical loss ratio (MLR) 
and performance based on price and quality. Exchanges 
might provide this information with graphics, simplified 
language and navigation to allow consumers to prioritize 
according to their preferences and make informed choices.
Exchanges can take the comparative display of 
information further by giving a special designation (i.e., 
“Top Value” or “Exchange Select”) to plans that submit 
the lowest-price bids, have consistently high MLRs,  
and/or score high on quality and customer satisfaction 
metrics. They might additionally program the plan 
chooser software so that these plans are the first that 
appear when consumers conduct a search.63
The Massachusetts Connector has effectively used 
the web to guide consumers to plans with lower cost 
structures. Because plan offerings are standardized and 
each has received the Connector’s approval, consumers 
are able to make apples-to-apples comparisons and 
choose lower-priced plans with confidence that they are 
still getting a quality product. As a result, plans with 
lower cost structures (i.e., with tighter networks and/
or lower marketing budgets) have a greater market share 
in Commonwealth Choice than they do in the outside 
market.64 At the same time, the Connector continues to 
offer plans with wider networks for consumers that prefer 
less restricted access to providers.
Factors that Could Support – or Undermine –  
Active Purchasing in the States
States’ decisions about whether and how to pursue an 
active purchasing strategy for their exchange will hinge on 
a wide range of factors and each state will face a different 
calculus, depending on such environmental factors as 
market concentration, market rules, the number and risk 
profile of exchange enrollees and the exchange’s ability 
to develop and maintain leadership and staff with the 
requisite expertise.
States that decide to pursue active purchasing may do so 
in any number of ways. Some may conclude that direct 
“price negotiation” with carriers will not work well in 
their markets, but will build a web portal that allows 
apples-to-apples comparisons and strongly encourages 
consumers to select plans that offer the best value. Some 
states may decide that the best thing they can do to 
promote competition is to recruit new market entrants 
or provide technical assistance to help home-grown, 
regional plans participate in the exchange. Others may 
conclude that the best way to make insurance coverage 
more affordable in the long term is to partner with 
participating health plans to drive delivery system reform 
at the provider level. Other states might have a political 
leadership that rejects any effort to organize or reform 
their insurance markets. Below we discuss a range of 
environmental factors that could either support or 
undermine the exchange’s success as an active purchaser.
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Market Concentration
Nearly all health insurance markets in the U.S. are 
highly concentrated; in 48 percent of metropolitan 
statistical areas, just one insurer holds at least half of 
the market.67 In general, that large insurer (as well as 
its closest competitor) will be a “must have” plan in the 
state exchange, if the exchange is to attract unsubsidized 
individuals and small businesses. For some states, these 
large carriers may be the only ones with networks that 
reach statewide. Equally important, at least initially, is 
that consumers and small business owners see these brand 
name plans when they shop for coverage. If an exchange 
fails to attract a sufficient mix of insurance products that 
consumers want to buy, it could stumble out of the gate, 
failing to attract sufficient enrollment.
Nothing in the ACA requires plans to participate in the 
exchanges and plans will make pragmatic business decisions 
about whether to participate. Many health insurance 
carriers may dislike the head-to-head nature of competition 
in an exchange and prefer instead to use traditional 
distribution channels for their products. As Elliot Wicks 
noted in a 2002 brief for the Commonwealth Fund:
Health plans have often been hostile to the purchasing 
co-op model for several reasons. First, they are 
understandably wary of the model because it gives their 
customers bargaining clout. Second, they do not like the 
individual-choice feature of co-ops because it provides 
enrollees with a ready way of switching to a different 
health plan during every open enrollment period. Third, 
they believe that their chances of getting and keeping all 
of the employees in an employer group – which brings 
in more revenue and helps spread risk – are much 
better when they market to that group outside of the 
purchasing co-op.68
Past efforts to operate exchanges have largely failed 
because plans chose not to participate or, in some cases, 
actively worked to undermine the exchange.69 However, 
the ACA’s market reforms that go into effect in 2014, 
including the responsibility to purchase insurance, the 
elimination of health status underwriting and premium 
subsidies will create a very different competitive 
environment than has existed in the past. As a result, 
some carriers may see opportunities to expand their 
market shares within a structure of individual choice,  
and exchanges should seek to partner constructively with 
these carriers. 
If an exchange wishes to contract selectively with plans or 
negotiate with them on price and quality, it needs to attract 
a reasonable mix of carriers with products that consumers 
and small business owners want to buy. If the exchange 
sits in a market that is highly concentrated, this approach 
to active purchasing will likely be unsuccessful. An 
Connecticut Business and Industry Association
The Connecticut Business and Industry Association 
(CBIA) sponsors Health Connections, which began 
in 1995 with the goal of providing its member small 
businesses (3 to 100 employees) with one place to 
shop among a choice of health plans. Employees 
choose their own plan (an “employee choice” model) 
and enroll in coverage with the help of a broker. 
Enrollment to date is 6,000 businesses covering 
85,000 lives. 
CBIA does not engage in what might be traditionally 
considered “active purchasing.” However, it plays 
an active role in selecting products to offer in the 
exchange. According to CBIA officials, exchange 
staff actively monitor what consumers are buying 
and work with brokers to identify attractive products. 
Sometimes those products are already available in the 
small group market and sometimes they ask carriers 
to develop new products for CBIA. Recently, two 
carriers pulled out of the small group market, leaving 
just two carriers participating in CBIA’s exchange. A 
concentrated market, a CBIA official said, presents 
a challenge for any exchange because it means the 
exchange’s “attractiveness…is minimized.”65 In other 
words, as a market organizer, an exchange operating 
in a concentrated market will be hampered because 
there are fewer options to organize.
However, CBIA’s leadership believes it continues to 
provide an appealing alternative for small businesses, 
for two primary reasons. First, employers can make 
a defined contribution to their employees’ coverage 
and their employees can choose among the health 
plan options (the “employee choice” model). Those 
employees choosing more expensive coverage must 
pay the difference.66
Second, CBIA provides a full suite of services to 
small employers that don’t have their own human 
resources department. For example, CBIA provides 
member businesses with other insurance products 
(e.g., long-term disability and life insurance) and 
administration of COBRA coverage, Section 125 
plans, Health Reimbursement Accounts and Health 
Savings Accounts. This feature gives the exchange 
an advantage when competing with the outside small 
group market. 
Active Purchasing for Health Insurance Exchanges: An Analysis of Options 13
exchange in this environment may want to approach active 
purchasing as a long-term strategy. As Professor Timothy S. 
Jost of Washington and Lee University School of Law notes 
in an interview for the Commonwealth Fund, “Exchanges 
may want to start out as less selective and gradually move 
toward a more active purchasing model.”70
In addition, an exchange in a concentrated market 
can work to recruit new market entrants or provide 
encouragement to smaller carriers that might be able to 
expand market share within the exchange. If it can’t be 
a successful price negotiator, it can focus its efforts to 
promote better consumer decision-making and encourage 
competition based on price and quality. It can also 
collaborate with other large purchasers in the market  
such as employer coalitions, the state Medicaid agency 
and the state government employee plan to align 
purchasing strategies and send consistent signals regarding 
quality improvement and delivery system reform to 
carriers and providers. 
Size and Risk Profile of The Exchange
The larger the exchange becomes, the more likely it can 
exercise leverage in the marketplace. Even though it will 
be the exclusive source of coverage for individuals eligible 
for federal premium and cost-sharing subsidies and will 
therefore constitute a large share of the individual market, 
in most states, exchanges will have a relatively small share 
of the total commercial market (including employer 
coverage). As one expert noted, in many ways an exchange 
that actively purchases on behalf of its enrollees would 
play the same role a large employer plays in soliciting bids 
to provide coverage to its workers.71 Yet a growing number 
of large employers feel that they have little real leverage  
in an increasingly concentrated insurance market.72 And 
the individuals and small businesses that the exchange 
may wish to serve will have alternative options in the 
outside market.
It is helpful to think about the potential population for  
a state exchange in three categories:
  • Subsidy-eligible individuals and families. These 
individuals, with incomes up to 400 percent of FPL, 
can access federal premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
only through the exchange. This population represents 
a greater proportion of the market in some states than 
others. For example, 76 percent of Mississippi residents 
have incomes below 400 percent of FPL compared 
to 52 percent in Connecticut.73 This will largely 
be a “captive population” (with possible exceptions 
discussed below) that many health plans might be 
eager to serve.
  • Self-pay individuals and families. Individuals with 
incomes over 400 percent of FPL may sign up for 
coverage through insurance exchanges, but they are 
not eligible for subsidies. The exchange will need to 
provide an adequate mix of affordable plan choices to 
incentivize them to participate. 
  • Small businesses. Small businesses with up to 50 
employees are eligible to enroll through an exchange, 
with a state option to expand their small group market 
to up to 100 employees. Beginning in 2017, states can 
allow large employers to participate. Eligible small 
businesses (with no more than 25 employees and 
average wages under $50,000) can access premium tax 
credits through the exchange for two years. This may 
give some employers a modest, temporary incentive 
to purchase through exchanges. However, as it will 
with self-pay individuals, the exchange will need 
to demonstrate that it can add value to the options 
currently available in the outside small group market.
For subsidy-eligible individuals, those at the higher end 
of the income scale will not necessarily be a captive 
population for the exchange. The generosity of the federal 
subsidies drops off considerably between 250-400% of 
poverty (see Table 1). Depending on how states regulate 
their non-group markets outside the exchange, these 
individuals might find products outside the exchange that 
are more affordable to them, even though they would lose 
access to subsidies.
A state’s decision to establish a “Basic Health Plan” 
(BHP) for the lowest-income individuals eligible for 
subsidies in the exchange could also reduce enrollment 
Table 1. Maximum Nongroup Premiums Based on Income
Income
Maximum Household  
Premium Payment
Up to 133% of poverty 2% of income
133-150% of poverty 3-4% of income
150-200% of poverty 4-6.3% of income
200-250% of poverty 6.3-8.05% of income
250-300% of poverty 8.05-9.5% of income
350-400% of poverty 9.5% of income
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in the exchange and impact its ability to be an active 
purchaser. Authorized under the ACA and pitched to 
states as a “more affordable alternative to health insurance 
Exchanges,” the BHP program gives the states the option 
to enroll low-income individuals between 133-200 percent 
of FPL in a Medicaid-like plan.74 If a state establishes a 
BHP, the federal government would provide 95 percent 
of the premium subsidy that it would have spent on those 
individuals if they were enrolled in the exchange. If 
states leverage Medicaid provider discounts for the BHP 
program, they will likely be able to set premiums lower 
than exchange premiums and roll the extra federal subsidy 
into a richer benefit package or higher provider rates. One 
estimate indicates that states could access an extra $1,000 
per enrollee if they establish a BHP instead of enrolling 
low-income individuals in the exchange.75
However, BHPs could pull a significant percentage 
of what would otherwise be a “captive” population 
for state insurance exchanges. The Urban Institute 
has estimated that, in an average state, a BHP would 
reduce the percentage of the population enrolled in the 
average exchange from 16 to 14 percent of all residents.76 
While this is a small total reduction, the BHP would 
significantly lower the number of “captive” individuals 
in the exchange – i.e., those eligible for substantial 
federal premium and cost-sharing subsidies. As noted in 
the chart above, once an individual approaches the 250 
percent FPL threshold, the generosity of his or her subsidy 
diminishes considerably. This makes it more likely, in a 
state that allows a looser regulatory environment outside 
the exchange, that young and healthy individuals at 
the higher end of the income range will find a cheaper 
product in the outside market. However, while the BHP 
may result in the exchange having a smaller proportion of 
the commercial market than it might have otherwise, the 
exchange could increase its market leverage by aligning 
purchasing strategies with the BHP. And states may have 
greater financial incentives to pursue cost management in 
the BHP than they would in an exchange because they 
will be able to retain any savings that result.
Market Rules
The insurance rules for the individual and small group 
markets outside of the exchange will have a critical impact 
on the ability to be an active purchaser. 
The primary challenge – and responsibility – of the 
exchange is to protect itself against adverse selection. As 
Professor Jost notes, “The single most important reason 
why some exchanges have not succeeded in the past is 
that they became the victims of adverse selection – they 
were unable to capture a large enough share of the healthy 
participants in the insurance market.”77 Indeed, if its 
survival is at stake, the whole notion of an exchange 
being an active purchaser is largely moot – it will not be 
able to attract a sufficient number of plans with which 
to selectively contract or negotiate. Existing exchanges 
that have to compete with an outside market, such as 
HealthPass New York, CBIA and the Massachusetts 
Connector, identify the equality of the inside/outside 
market rules as essential to their sustainability.78
For states establishing exchanges under the ACA, the law 
allows for small but potentially meaningful differences in 
the market rules. For example, all plans in the exchange 
must meet certain network adequacy standards. If a state 
allows plans in the outside market to operate with less 
robust networks, those plans could sell their products more 
cheaply and attract healthier enrollees than exchange plans 
with equivalent benefits. Similarly, exchange plans are 
forbidden from using marketing practices that discourage 
higher-risk people from enrolling. If the state allows plans 
in the outside market to use marketing strategies that 
discourage sicker people, it could result in adverse selection 
against the exchange. States will need to use their licensing 
and regulatory authority to ensure a level playing field on 
these and other market rules if they want a successful and 
sustainable exchange.
Exchanges also need to worry about adverse selection 
among plans within the exchange. According to 
Bill Kramer, an executive with the Pacific Business 
Group on Health (which operated California’s failed 
small business exchange, PacAdvantage): “Insurance 
companies are obsessed with avoiding bad risk.” One 
lesson from PacAdvantage is that “if plans felt they were 
being selected against, they bailed out.”79 This is for 
good reason: as soon as a carrier starts to take on sicker 
enrollees than its peers, the resulting higher claims (and 
thus, premiums) can trigger an adverse selection “spiral” 
that often cannot be reversed. Officials involved with 
existing exchanges such as HealthPass New York and 
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the Massachusetts Connector indicated that “carriers’ 
confidence in risk adjustment is critical.”80
The ACA gives the states some tools to boost such 
confidence, through requirements that they implement a 
risk adjustment program among carriers and a temporary 
reinsurance program. If the exchange can demonstrate to 
carriers that it has an average risk profile that mirrors the 
rest of the market and is effectively managing risk among 
its product offerings, carriers may say, “I can’t not bid on 
this business.”81 Officials with HealthPass New York’s 
exchange attribute their success in attracting carriers in 
large part to the health of its population relative to the 
outside market.82
State Resources
Being an active purchaser can be resource-intensive. To 
do it well requires sitting down with plans, one-on-one, 
early and often to discuss goals, priorities, requirements 
and areas of mutual interest. It requires staff time, market 
research and ongoing outreach to stakeholders. It requires 
a staff and leadership with the knowledge and expertise 
to go toe-to-toe with the carriers. It requires careful 
monitoring of consumer demands and managing  
a portfolio of products to meet consumers’ needs.
For some states, assembling a board of directors with 
sufficient expertise that is also free from conflicts of 
interest could be a challenge. It may be similarly difficult 
to recruit, develop and retain a director and staff that 
can perform the necessary duties. For states that choose 
to house their exchange within the executive branch or 
require the exchange to meet the same personnel and 
procurement standards as state government agencies, pay 
scales and civil service rules may hinder their ability to 
attract individuals with the requisite experience. States 
that house their exchange in a non-profit outside the 
government structure could face challenges coordinating 
with other state agencies on purchasing strategies. Other 
states simply might not want to operate an exchange that 
requires a large operating budget.
One thing is clear: active purchasing cannot be done 
effectively without an infrastructure to do it. Those 
with on-the-ground experience with purchasing groups 
consistently emphasize the need to have a dedicated 
staff focused on the responsibilities of being an active 
purchaser. For example, when one large purchaser moved 
to standardize benefits offered to its employees, the chair 
of its benefits committee found that plans would try to 
skirt the new requirements in their policy’s “fine print.” He 
emphasized, “You have to stay on top of these things.”86 
Exchanges that do have the necessary personnel will 
require an adequate operating budget. Many states are 
considering an assessment on carriers or subscribers to 
support their exchange.87 These assessments will add to 
the costs of insurance. As a result, exchanges will likely 
HealthPass New York
HealthPass began in 1999 with $1 million in seed 
money from the Mayor’s office and the goal of giving 
small business greater access to coverage and 
stemming the tide of working uninsured. Sponsored by 
the Northeast Business Group on Health, HealthPass 
allows employees of participating employers to 
choose their own plan with a defined contribution 
from their employer. Almost half of the employers 
who buy coverage through HealthPass had no prior 
insurance and about one-fourth of the employees were 
previously uninsured.83 Enrollment has been growing. 
HealthPass covers 4,000 employers with 17,000 
employees, for a total of 33,000 covered lives.
HealthPass representatives say the program is a 
microcosm of the outside marketplace, acting as an 
organizer that selects certain products for offer within 
the exchange. The program offers between 20 and 30 
benefit options across four categories of products: 
in network providers only, in- and out-of-network 
provider options, a “cost-sharing” plan (i.e., more 
cost-sharing for most services other than preventive 
services) and HSA-eligible high deductible plans. For 
the first 18 months the program operated, they used 
standardized plans based on co-payment amount, 
but carriers said they couldn’t sustain that model 
and wanted to offer products based on what they 
thought would sell. In response, HealthPass moved 
to the current four groupings of coverage.84 Program 
representatives note the products they offer have 
lower MLRs than those offered in the outside market, 
suggesting the exchange is attracting employees 
with relatively lower claims costs. This, in turn, has 
made their exchange more attractive as a distribution 
channel for the carriers. 
HealthPass, like CBIA, must compete with the 
outside small group market for business and so 
concentrates on providing as many support services 
as possible – many of those same services offered 
by CBIA – in order to relieve employers of the burden 
of administering the program and not disadvantage 
them in the labor market when competing with large 
employers that offer services and benefits beyond 
health coverage.85
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come under political pressure to demonstrate that they 
are effectively managing the market and moderating 
premium increases. They will need to prove that the 
public investment in them is worth it.
Impact of Environment On One Form of Active 
Purchasing: Price Negotiation
Using the exchange to negotiate price discounts from 
carriers is an appealing concept, but will be challenging 
for many states to execute. And some may not want to – 
with only federal dollars at risk, some states may not want 
to pursue active purchasing at all. 
But even for states that do wish to negotiate on price, 
the fact that the exchange is not the sole distribution 
channel for insurance products marketed to self-pay 
individuals and small employers could limit its leverage to 
negotiate prices with carriers. Because the ACA requires 
that prices for the same products be the same inside and 
outside the exchange, any price discount the exchange 
negotiates with a carrier will have to apply to that product 
market-wide. While the exchange might have a large 
population, for most carriers it won’t be a large enough 
book of business to justify also discounting their rates in 
the outside market. The Massachusetts Connector has 
encountered this problem with its unsubsidized exchange 
(Commonwealth Choice), whose roughly 40,000 enrollees 
(about half the individual market) represent a small 
book of business for participating carriers. As a result, 
the Connector has had little leverage to garner price 
reductions from plans. “With CommChoice we’re largely 
just a price taker,” one Connector board member told us.88
That said, because the media and political spotlight will 
be on exchanges, particularly in the early years, a state 
may want to use its bully pulpit to encourage lower bids. 
For example, when carriers in Massachusetts submitted 
initial bids to the Connector in 2007, the Governor asked 
them to “sharpen their pencils,” and they returned with 
lower bids – although they achieved those lower bids 
largely by raising the cost-sharing in their benefit design.89
In any event, such efforts to push prices lower must 
honestly take into account plans’ underlying costs and 
need for solvency. If they don’t, plans will need to increase 
premiums by an even greater amount in the next bidding 
cycle or shift more costs to consumers.
Health policy experts on the NASI study panel on 
exchanges flag another challenge of price negotiation: the 
ability of plans to change their rates during the course 
of the year.90 In other words, a negotiated rate, to go 
into effect when people sign up during the next year’s 
open enrollment period, could be meaningless if carriers 
can adjust their rates monthly or quarterly outside of 
open enrollment. And if the exchange negotiates a rate 
guarantee throughout the year, but the state doesn’t 
impose the same requirement on plans in the outside 
market, plans bidding for exchange business would be 
placed at a disadvantage.91
But perhaps most importantly, simply negotiating 
premium discounts with plans year-to-year does nothing 
to tackle the long-term problem for consumers and small 
businesses: the runaway growth in the costs of health 
care. This is where an insurance exchange might have 
a dramatic impact. By consolidating individuals and 
small groups and potentially partnering with other large 
purchasers (i.e., state government employee purchasers, 
Medicaid and self-insured employers in the state) to align 
purchasing strategies, the exchange can incentivize health 
plans and, in turn, providers to deliver higher-quality 
care, more efficiently.
Our analysis gives rise to several findings. First, all states 
will have to empower their exchanges to take on a minimal 
level of “active purchasing” in order to meet the ACA’s 
requirements. At a minimum, they must have discretion to 
exclude a plan if it is not in the interest of enrollees.
Second, active purchasing is not just one activity but 
rather connotes a range of activities that involve an ability 
and willingness to act on behalf of individual and small 
group buyers and set rules for competition that encourage 
higher-quality, efficiency and consumer satisfaction.
Third, the most aggressive conception of active 
purchasing – the notion that an exchange will selectively 
contract with and negotiate price discounts with carriers 
– will face environmental and operational challenges in 
Concluding Comments
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many states. These may include heavily concentrated 
markets, inadequate size relative to the outside 
market, adverse selection, and a lack of the necessary 
infrastructure to take on the job. Exchanges can be 
effective in negotiating high-quality, lower-cost coverage, 
but it requires health plans that want to participate, 
a sufficient number of healthy enrollees, a regulatory 
environment that provides a level playing field and a 
leadership and staff with expertise and market savvy.
Finally, exchanges may have the greatest potential to 
improve value by incentivizing health plans and, in turn, 
providers to deliver higher-quality care, more efficiently. 
By consolidating individuals and small groups, potentially 
partnering with other large purchasers to align purchasing 
strategies and encouraging value-oriented consumer 
shopping, the exchange can encourage long-term delivery 
system reforms that can help improve quality and tackle 
the long-term challenge of unsustainable health care costs.
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